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Russian Trade Prospects in Smyrna:
An 1812 Consular Report
Theophilus C. Prousis
University of North Florida
Documents on Russian commerce in the Black Sea and the Levant offer
eyewitness description, firsthand observation and authentic information. These
qualities, to varying degrees, are evinced in this translated memorandum penned
by tsarist vice-consul Carlo A. Marracciny in Smyrna in December 1812 and
addressed to Foreign Minister Rumiantsev. The Marracciny report merits attention
by scholars of Russia's Eastern policy as a reminder that primary sources on
Russian trade, and on wider tsarist aims, in the Near East warrant collection and
presentation in an accessible format for students and scholars alike. This particular
document might very well become a small piece in a published compendium of
Russian records and resources on specific aspects of tsarist interaction with the
Ottoman Empire, including the commercial dimension of the Eastern Question.1
Russian contacts and connections with the Ottoman Empire are best
explored by tapping the rich and extensive assortment of materials in the Archive
of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI), the largest and most important
repository for scholarly investigation of foreign affairs during the tsarist era.2
Sixteen massive tomes of selected AVPRI documents, covering only the first three
decades of the 19th century, have appeared since 1960, and many of these
published records deal with facets of Russian policy in the Balkans and the Near
East, including trade in the eastern Mediterranean.3 The consular communiqué
presented here provides but one example of the various types of AVPRI
documents, published and unpublished, that deserve more scrutiny by scholars of
Russian-Ottoman relations.
Commerce and consulates converged in Russian Eastern policy with the
opening of the Black Sea to mercantile navigation and the establishment of
consular offices in the Ottoman Empire, both dating from the landmark Treaty of
Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774).4 A veteran of nearly twenty years in Russia's
diplomatic corps when he drafted this trade report in December 1812, vice-consul
Marracciny belonged to a cadre of skilled negotiators and officials whose tasks
included the promotion of Russian commerce in the Near East. By the early 19th
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century, Russia had consular representation in strategic points of the Ottoman
Empire, such as Jassy, Bucharest, Athens, Patras, Saloniki, Smyrna, Aleppo,
Jaffa, Alexandria, Cyprus and Chios. Virtually all of Russia's consular staff —
consuls, vice-consuls, interpreters, clerks, agents — were of Greek, Italian and
French descent. Their language expertise and administrative skill, also their
familiarity with Ottoman society and institutions, made these appointees
potentially useful as intermediaries with Ottoman officials and as conduits of
information for the tsarist embassy in Istanbul and the Foreign Ministry in St.
Petersburg.5 Consular duties consisted of preparing reports on trade, interceding
for Russian merchants and travelers, expediting commercial transactions,
providing notary services for Russian subjects and defending Russian state
interests. As interim head of the consulate-general of Smyrna, the principal
Ottoman emporium in the Levant, Marracciny exercised jurisdiction over consular
affairs in an area encompassed by Smyrna's bustling port, the harbor of Skala
Nova to the south, and the nearby islands of Chios, Samos and Mytilene.6
Consular records, correspondence and shipping vedomosti (registers), most
of them housed in AVPRI, offer telling detail on several aspects of Russia's
maritime traffic in Istanbul, Smyrna, Patras, Chios and other Ottoman ports.7 For
example, vedomosti on trade and navigation document that many of the captains
and sailors on Russian ships were of Greek and Italian descent. Most of their
employers, also of Greek and Italian origins, were merchants and ship owners who
had settled in Black Sea trade centers, most notably in Odessa, Taganrog,
Feodosiia, Evpatoriia, Kerch and Nikolaev, and who contributed to the economic
growth of the Russian South.8 Russia's merchant nexus extended from the
northern shores of the Euxine to the Mediterranean and encompassed major
entrepôts from Toulon, Marseilles and Malta to Smyrna and Beirut. Russia's chief
exports through the Black Sea were wheat, rye, barley, oats, salt, tallow, butter,
caviar and iron, while Russian imports from the Ottoman East consisted mainly of
cottons, dried fruits, olive oil, coffee, tobacco, wines and silks.
Consuls like Marracciny who suggested ways to advance trade found a
receptive patron in Nikolai P. Rumiantsev, Minister of Commerce in 1804-10 and
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1807-14. Trade figured prominently in
Rumiantsev's vision of imperial expansion, evinced in his support of the
Krusenstern-Rezanov expedition to Japan and the Russian-American Company's
exploration of North America. His ultimate aim was to transform Russia into a
commercial bridge between Europe and Asia by extending tsarist trade networks
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in the Near East, Central Asia and India.9 Winning a deserved reputation as a
champion of free commerce, Rumiantsev collaborated with Armand Emmanuel du
Plesis (Duc de Richelieu), governor general of New Russia, to cultivate the
economic progress of the Russian South and to enhance the mercantile stature of
Odessa, the region's burgeoning maritime hub.10 Trade in the Black Sea and the
Levant formed part of Rumiantsev's strategy of broader tsarist involvement in the
Near East, in pursuit of such interests as protecting Ottoman Orthodox Christians,
annexing the Danubian Principalities and exerting Russian influence in Istanbul
and the Straits.
Marracciny's report to Rumiantsev clearly suggests the “precarious balance”
between conflict, commerce and diplomacy along the Russian-Ottoman frontier,
as the two neighboring autocratic empires competed for lands, peoples and
resources yet engaged in mutually beneficial trade.11 The Russo-Turkish War of
1806-12, a conflict provoked by disputes over the administration of Moldavia and
Wallachia and fought mainly in the northern Balkans and the western Caucasus,
disrupted the peacetime course of Black Sea business.12 Even though Russia and
Turkey continued their mercantile traffic during the conflict and the value of
Odessa's exports to the Levant actually increased, Marracciny mentions the war's
debilitating consequences for Black Sea navigation.
The vice-consul's accurate observation echoed in the petitions Rumiantsev
received from merchants, port authorities and municipal officials who complained
of commercial setbacks and slowdowns in their Black Sea towns. Partly in
response to requests for his intercession, Rumiantsev endeavored to maintain
unimpeded passage for Russian and Ottoman merchant vessels in the Black Sea.
He also proposed to place Russian consuls in Sinope and Trebizond, ports well
situated along the northern coast of Anatolia and connected commercially to the
inland towns of Amasia, Tokat and Erzerum, a strategic fortress near the source of
the Euphrates and a key point on caravan routes between Anatolia, Persia and
India.13 When war officially ended with the Treaty of Bucharest in May 1812,
Rumiantsev anticipated that renewed Black Sea exchange would enable Russia to
expand its commercial and political influence in the Levant, and it was precisely
to realize these objectives that consuls like Marracciny gathered data and penned
memoranda for the Foreign Ministry.
The thrust of the vice-consul's message is to point out the opportunities for
Russian exports, above all grain, in a seller's market. A shortage of grain in the
Smyrna environs, caused by a combination of poor harvest, plague, locusts and
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drought, raised the price of this life-sustaining commodity. Not only was Odessa
well situated to ship Russian grain to Smyrna and other nearby ports, but Russian-
flagged vessels had the advantage of relying on Greek partners in the Levant.
Boats from Hydra, Psara and other islands paid ready cash in gold and silver coin
for grain cargoes transferred from Russian carriers. Greek skippers and sailors,
owing to their navigational skills and commercial expertise, not only served as key
intermediaries in Russia's grain traffic but comprised a sizable portion of the
Russian and Ottoman merchant marines in the Black Sea, the Levant and the
Mediterranean in general.14 According to Marracciny, significant profits could be
made from additional Russian exports, such as iron, glassware, butter, caviar,
linen and hides. Thus, a favorable balance of trade awaited merchants and shippers
who took advantage of these opportunities.
Besides commercial information, the vice-consul's dispatch conveys a few
details about local conditions in Smyrna. Frequent fires, together with periodic
outbreaks of plague and other calamities, made life precarious in this Levantine
port. Marracciny was hardly immune to the prevalent anti-Turk and anti-Muslim
bias one detects in most European travel and diplomatic writing on the Near East,
as evinced in the consul's reference to “the apathy of the Turks” when describing
the failure of farmers and officials to take sufficient precautions to ward off the
damaging effects of a locust attack. In the same vein, Marracciny repeats a
common theme in western images and perceptions of the Ottoman realm —
corruption — when he asserts that, for a price, “any governor deems it possible to
evade the orders of his sovereign.”15
In a subsequent communiqué of January 1814 to the director of the Foreign
Ministry's consular department, Marracciny reported that his expectations for
Russia's Black Sea enterprise were indeed realized.16 Data he assembled on
Russian navigation from April 1813 to January 1814 indicated a favorable balance
of trade in the port of Smyrna. Exports consisted of grain, iron and various other
goods, and Russian grain supplies provisioned the islands of the Aegean
archipelago and the coasts of the Morea. Black Sea commerce continued to profit
from the resumption of unobstructed shipping, but the Eastern crisis of the 1820s,
brought on by the Greek War of Independence and the Russo-Turkish War of
1828-29, once again disrupted merchant traffic and threatened the economic well-
being of Odessa and other Euxine ports.17
In preparing this document, I have relied on the published Russian
translation of the French original and endeavored to render it into clear idiomatic
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English without altering its spirit or meaning. Though I have made slight changes
in syntax and punctuation in order to make the translation more fluid, I have
generally remained faithful to the particulars of Marracciny's style and viewpoint.
My own emendations appear in brackets, and I have inserted explanatory notes,
including relevant observations from two western travelers in Smyrna in 1812-13
who corroborate the vice-consul's information.
“A Dispatch from Vice-Consul C.A. Marracciny in Smyrna to
Russian Foreign Minister Nikolai P. Rumiantsev,
31 December 1812/12 January 1813”18
Your Excellency,
The protection, which your excellency is favorably disposed to render to commerce
everywhere, allows me to take the liberty to describe for you the benefits and bright
prospects that are opening up for the shipping and trade of our Black Sea ports with
these regions [Smyrna environs] in connection with the successful conclusion of
peace between Russia and the Ottoman Porte.19 [I also take the liberty] to point out
the profits that the customs offices of [our] empire will make thanks to the
considerable influx of monies.
Having served his imperial majesty in consulates of the Levant for seventeen
years prior to the war which just ended, I have acquired some experience in matters
concerning [Turkey's] commerce with Russia. Ever since you deigned to entrust me
with supervising the interim administration of the consulate-general in [Smyrna],
and immediately upon arrival here, I began to collect all the information which, in
my opinion, could be useful for promoting the expansion of our trade and shipping
in the Black Sea. I have the honor of submitting the results of this endeavor for
your excellency's consideration. Please regard [this report] with indulgence, taking
into account my zeal for the interests and the majesty of my sovereign.
Ever since the [Russo-Turkish War of 1806-12] interrupted communications
with the Black Sea, particularly in the last few years, the surrounding areas have
been deprived of goods supplied to them by Russia via the Black Sea and have had
to pay an extremely high price for the small amount of merchandise that has been
successfully imported.20 The demand for [these products] has constantly grown in
Turkey itself, and orders have continued to come in from the islands of the
[Aegean] archipelago and from the Adriatic, Malta, and Spain.
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Grain, one of the major articles of Black Sea commerce, has currently
become an exceedingly important commodity.21 Over the past two years, the grain
harvest in [the Smyrna area] has been mediocre, if not to say poor, which to a large
extent can be explained by a shortage of farmers. Many of these valuable workers
used to come to this region from the archipelago and from the Ionian Islands; but
lately, encountering only continued burdens from the Turkish government instead
of support and deserved encouragement, the farmers have gone back to their lands
and not yet returned. Plague, raging in Anatolia for two years now, has cut down
those who remained.22 Several years before this calamity, an invasion of locusts
devastated this region, supposedly because of the apathy of the Turks, who [failed]
to do anything to exterminate them. [Locusts] devoured the first harvest each year
and accounted for why even the second harvest, conducted late and doomed to
drought brought on by intense heat, yielded a very meager crop for the peasants.23
Thus, over the last two years, the cost of grain has become quite expensive,
and to satisfy the daily bread requirement, all sorts of other grains have been mixed
with wheat [and barley] .... [These conditions] have raised the price of fodder and
hampered the [land] transport of grain. In the [Anatolian] hinterland grain is readily
available, but transportation charges have increased the cost of this commodity so
much that shipping [by land] has become pointless.
The Porte has banned, under threat of the death penalty, the export of wheat
and barley. Yet despite these stern prohibitions, smuggling constantly takes places
in a country where any governor deems it possible to evade the orders of his
sovereign. Naturally, however, this can be done only with the help of money, and
traders who are able to procure grain for Spain, Portugal and other countries badly
in need of it must pay an exorbitant price for [this contraband].
Such is the current state of the grain market, which cannot but render a
highly beneficial influence on Russian commerce in the Black Sea, [and] the rapid
development of our trade will become possible with the [resumption of unrestricted]
navigation.
Odessa is favorably located to provide a vast amount of grain, which can be
loaded on ships flying the Russian flag and transported through the Dardanelles,
and the Turkish government will not be able to interfere. Russian ships will not
have to be exposed to the dangers and accidents entailed by a more protracted
voyage in order to sell their cargo profitably. Right after exiting the Straits, they will
immediately come across many Greek vessels from Hydra, Psara, and other islands
of the archipelago, whose sole business consists of such exchange and who lie in
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wait for ships carrying provisions.24 These [Greek] boats usually have on board an
available supply of money in the form of gold and silver coins.25 A commercial
deal can be struck right on the spot, and it remains only for the Russian captain to
transfer his cargo to the Greek vessel. He at once will receive ready cash and [can
then] quickly return to our ports. In favorable weather this operation can be
repeated, and traders will reap a good return.
Besides grain, one of the most prominent articles of trade in the Black Sea is
iron. Its use here has always been considerable but has become more widespread
ever since recurrent fires have ravaged the city and convinced residents to erect
more buildings with iron windows and doors.26 When the port of Trieste carried on
an active maritime trade with these parts, this exchange brought Smyrna a large
quantity of iron nails and sundry iron wares. Iron was also imported from Holland.
[But] this commerce has now ceased or, in any case, is altogether negligible. Russia
has factories that manufacture nails [and thus] could replace German [imports] and
make a handsome profit from selling in this market.27
Additional articles of trade are window glass and various other objects made
from glass and crystal. Prices for these goods are quite exorbitant here, since
Germans ship them by land from Bohemia to Odessa or deliver them to Trieste or
Malta, whence they are transported here after paying the required fees for shipped
land consignment; if the merchandise is shipped from Malta, expenses are no less
because it is necessary to have a double license and to pay a very steep customs
duty. Despite all [these] expenditures, German merchants profit from this trade.
Russia can provide the same goods at significantly lower cost, [and] this exchange,
it goes without saying, will yield a very substantial return for our traders.
Butter and caviar are necessities in this country.28 Prices for them have
fluctuated greatly. Whereas ten years ago butter sold for twenty-five paras an oke,
now it sells for two hundred paras;29 the cost of caviar has gone up by the same
ratio.
Russian linen and hides also are popular and profitable commodities at
market; besides their ample use here, they are exported in bulk to Malta and from
there ferried to Italy on ships that have appropriate licenses.
As a result, the balance of Russia's exchange with Turkey via the Black Sea
will turn out entirely in favor of Russia. Merchants and shippers will not be able to
find more propitious circumstances and, bearing in mind the manifest advantages of
such trade, will not require any incentive. These benefits will not escape the
enlightened attention of your excellency, and once you promote them, you can be
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certain that people will immediately be found who will want to profit from [these
opportunities]. I would be fortunate, your excellency, if my initial memorandum [as
interim head of the Smyrna consulate-general] merited your approval and helped
fulfill my steadfast aims on behalf of my country's prosperity. In the future I will
not fail to apprise your excellency of everything that will affect the growth of this
trade, which by rights one can expect.
I take the opportunity to ask for your excellency's protection and favor.
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June, business suffered a great deal as European residents and Greek merchants “shut themselves
up in their houses.” British traveler John Oliver Hanson, who visited Smyrna in 1813, describes
many aspects of the city's life and society, including the frequency and impact of plague attacks.
See John Oliver Hanson, “Recollections of Smyrna,” Mikrasiatika Chronika 13 (1967): 476-82,
hereafter cited as “Hanson.”
23. Hanson (pp. 468-69) comments on locusts in the Smyrna environs: “The locust is an insect
unfortunately too well known throughout the land. They come in myriads. In one night a garden is
entirely destroyed by them for the season. In an hour the verdure of a field entirely disappears,
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when attacked by them, so great are their numbers and their power of destruction. In size and
appearance they are extremely like an immense grasshopper.”
24. Greek sailing vessels from the Aegean archipelago and the Ionian Islands operated much of the
transit trade in the Levant in the early 19th century; in particular, boats from Psara, Hydra and
Spetsae carried foodstuffs to and from Smyrna, Constantinople and other ports. See Aubin, 36-37,
89, and George B. Leon, “The Greek Merchant Marine (1453-1850),” in Stelios A. Papadopoulos,
ed., The Greek Merchant Marine (Athens: National Bank of Greece, 1972), 13-52.
25. Marracciny does not specify if these were Ottoman or European coins. The Levant did not have
a common or standardized system of currency for business transactions at this time; Ottoman gold
and silver coins circulated along with money from Austria, Spain, Venice, France, Holland and
Britain. For more on the confusing array of Levantine currencies in the early 19th century, see
Aubin, 14-16, 31-34, 122-23; Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey, 326-29; and „evket
Pamuk's essay “Evolution of the Ottoman Monetary System, 1326-1914,” in Inalcik and Quataert,
eds., An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 947-80. The chaotic mix of coins,
not to mention their fluctuating values in regional markets, would further explain why European
merchants had to rely on Greeks, Armenians, Arab Christians and other locals as intermediaries
and brokers in Levantine commerce.
26. According to Aubin (pp. 28, 40-42), Turkey was a country “where fires are frequent and when
they happen lay almost whole towns in ashes.” Turkish shops and bazaars were “miserable
wooden huts, which are continually exposed to the risk of being consumed by the flames.”
27. Aubin (pp. 65-66) discusses the prevalence of Russian iron and nails in the Smyrna market.
28. Aubin (p. 63) writes that butter “is consumed in very considerable quantities — the country
produces a great deal, but not enough to supply the demand. Large parcels are sent from Russia in
casks or hides ....”
29. Both Hanson (pp. 462-63) and Aubin (pp. 31, 34-36) provide nearly identical detail on
currency, weights and measures. A para was a Turkish coin worth a small fraction of a piaster; in
1812 forty paras equalled a piaster and roughly twenty piasters were the equivalent of one pound
English sterling. An oke was a unit of weight equal to approximately three pounds.
